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Introduction	
	Working	class	households	 in	the	U.S.,	as	 in	a	number	of	other	countries,	have	a	weak	hand.	When	the	ill	winds	of	an	economic	downturn	blow,	their	employment	chances,	their	income	levels,	 their	 chances	 to	 build	 up	 some	 savings	 for	 a	 future	 retirement	 income	 and	 their	chances	to	own	a	home	are	all	materially	diminished.	An	economic	downturn	can	easily	be	caused	by	events	in	the	home	mortgage	markets	that,	at	the	time,	appear	to	amount	to	little	more	than	benign	neglect.		In	the	U.S.,	the	growth	in	the	level	of	home	mortgages	could	(and	should)	have	been	managed	during	the	period	2002-2003	and	even	more	so	during	2004-2005.	Neither	the	Fed	nor	the	Treasury	managed	the	rapid	growth	levels	in	the	volume	of	mortgage	lending.	The	financial	crisis	 of	 2007-2008	 was	 the	 direct	 consequence	 of	 such	 benign	 neglect.	 Much	 has	 been	written	about	the	banking	crisis	and	how	such	a	crisis	could	have	been	avoided	along	with	the	need	 for	 taxpayers	 to	bail	out	banks	or	 the	wider	 financial	markets.	Less	attention	has	been	paid	to	 the	short	and	 long	term	effects	on	working	class	households,	notwithstanding	the	fact	that	such	households	bore	the	brunt	of	the	impact	of	the	crisis	through	a	loss	of	jobs,	through	a	reduced	or	even	negative	income	growth	and	through	markedly	increased	levels	of	foreclosure	 proceedings	 and	 home	 repossessions.	 Their	 chances	 to	 build	 up	 an	 adequate	pension	reserve	were	also	undermined.	On	top	of	this,	U.S.	government	debt	levels	doubled	over	the	period	2008-2015,	storing	up	more	problems	for	future	household	income	levels.		The	reaction	of	the	Fed	to	the	financial	crisis,	other	than	helping	nearly	all	banks	to	survive,	was	 to	 set	 a	 policy	 of	 ultra	 low	 interest	 rates	 plus	 engaging	 in	 quantitative	 easing.		Overlooked	 by	 the	 Fed	 and	 others	 was	 that	 rather	 than	 managing	 the	 economy	 through	setting	 the	 price	 of	 money,	 a	 management	 control	 system	 over	 mortgage	 credit	 volumes	would	have	been	much	more	effective.	Some	of	the	consequences	of	these	policies	as	well	as	the	proposals	for	future	control	systems	will	be	discussed	in	this	paper.		Working	class	households	set	themselves	apart	from	the	more	affluent	ones	in	that	they	need	to	 borrow	heavily	 in	 order	 to	 acquire	 a	 home.	 They	 are	 also	 fully	 dependent	 on	 a	 regular	income	 from	 their	 jobs	 and	 on	 increases	 in	 wage	 levels,	 which	 help	 to	 cover	 the	 costs	 of	inflation.	 Any	 disturbance	 to	 this	 pattern	 has	 not	 only	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	 the	 economic	survival	of	individual	working	class	households,	but	also	on	macro-economic	growth	levels.		The	after-effects	of	the	financial	crisis	are	still	to	being	felt	to-day,	especially	through	lower	home	ownership	 levels,	 through	 a	 crisis	 in	 the	pension	 sector	 and	 through	 years	 of	 below	inflation	wage	increases.	The	readjustment	period	has	been	extremely	long	and	at	the	costs	of	 a	 doubling	 of	 U.S.	 government	 debt	 over	 the	 last	 seven	 years	 and	 this	 excludes	 the	approximate	$7	trillion	implicit	guarantees	on	mortgage	bonds.		The	U.S.	 and	 other	 countries’	 economic	management	 systems	 need	 a	 shake	 up.	 	 Economic	tools	need	to	be	redefined	in	order	to	ensure	that	rather	than	working	class	households	being	the	natural	casualties	in	an	economy,	they	constitute	the	cornerstone	of	creating	the	overall	health	in	economic	growth	levels.			
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1.	Working	class	households	and	the	outstanding	mortgage	levels	in	the	U.S.	over	the	
period	1997-2015	
	
1.1	The	‘what	if’	questions	
	In	this	paper	four	economic	variables	will	be	considered	with	a	particular	focus	on	working	class	households.		The	first	variable	is	the	provision	of	mortgage	credit	to	these	and	other	households	and	the	link	with	ownership	of	homes.		The	second	variable	relates	to	unemployment	levels,	as	this	is	a	key	issue	for	working	class	households.		The	third	variable	relates	to	income	growth	after	taking	into	account	inflation	levels.		The	fourth	variable	 is	the	ability	of	working	class	households	to	build	up	a	sufficient	pot	of	savings	to	last	for	their	retirement	period.		
	
1.2	The	mortgage	credit	issue	
	The	relationship	between	an	individual	mortgage	and	the	price	of	a	home	is	an	obscure	one.	Firstly	some	buyers	are	able	to	 finance	such	acquisition	fully	out	of	own	funds;	others	may	sell	 their	 existing	 home	 and	 subsequently	 part	 finance	 their	 new	 home	 with	 a	 mortgage.		Others	try	to	get	on	the	property	ladder	for	the	first	time,	but	need	a	deposit	amount	out	of	own	savings.	Over	time	such	deposit	requirement	may	vary	as	a	percentage	of	the	purchase	price.	Working	class	households	nearly	always	need	a	mortgage	loan.		Broadly,	 households	 only	 deal	 with	 one	 financial	 institution	 as	 their	 counterpart.	 The	aggregation	of	all	mortgage	lending	leads	to	the	total	outstanding	mortgage	levels	and	their	annual	changes	therein.	The	aggregation	process	 is	done	per	financial	 institution	as	well	as	by	 all	 financial	 institutions	 together.	 An	 individual	 household	 has	 no	 influence	 over	 the	volume	of	mortgage	lending.	If	a	household	receives	a	mortgage	offer,	such	offer	is	based	on	the	 risk	 criteria	 set	 by	 the	 lender.	 Lenders	 set	 the	 risk	 criteria,	 not	 the	 borrowers.	Competition	 between	 lenders	 may	 make	 them	 offer	 slightly	 different	 conditions	 for	mortgages	 at	 any	 chosen	 time.	 However	 no	 individual	 lender	 determines	 the	 collective	growth	in	outstanding	mortgage	levels;	all	lenders	together	determine	such	growth.		As	table	1	below	illustrates,	the	growth	pattern	in	U.S.	mortgage	lending1	was	very	rapid	and	uneven	over	the	whole	period	1997-2015																																																																																																																																																																																										1	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/categories/32258	
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																																																																					Working	class	households	and	the	effects	of	the	financial	crisis©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		Table	1:	Overview	of	 the	U.S.	outstanding	mortgage	 levels	over	 the	period	1997-2015,	the	annual	change	in	mortgage	volumes,	the	effective	Fed	Funds	Rate	and	the	change	in	the	Households’	Real	Estate	values		
Year	 Outstanding	
Mortgage	levels	
X	$trillion	
	
Annual	increase	
In	Mortgage	
Volume		
X$billion	
Effective	
Fed	Funds		
Rate	%	
Increase	in	
Annual	
Household	
Real	 estate	
Values		
X$billion	
1997	 		3.753	 					216	 5.25-5.50	 				210	
1998	 		4.055	 					302	 5.56-4.68	 					836	
1999	 		4.431	 				376	 4.63-5.30	 					946	
2000	 		4.814	 					383	 5.45-6.40	 			1572	
2001	 		5.322	 					508	 5.98-1.82	 			1354	
2002	 		6.028	 				706	 1.73-1.24	 			1298	
2003	 		6.910	 					882	 1.24-0.98	 			1618	
2004	 		7.859	 					949	 1.00-2.16	 			2511	
2005	 		8.913	 		1054	 2.28-4.16	 			3014	
2006	 		9.910	 					997	 4.29-5.24	 					509	
2007	 10.613	 					703	 5.25-4.24	 -		1813	
2008	 10.580	 -						33	 3.94-0.16	 -		3197	
2009	 10.419	 -				161	 0.15-0.12	 -				454	
2010	 		9.921	 -				498	 0.11-0.18	 -				555	
2011	 		9.702	 -				219	 0.17-0.07	 -				293	
2012	 		9.491	 -				211	 0.08-0.16	 				1412	
2013	 		9.401	 -						90	 0.14-0.09	 				2102	
2014	 		9.400	 -								1	 0.07-0.12	 				1096	
2015	 		9.491	 							91	 0.11-0.24	 				1255				The	main	conclusion	out	of	 table	1	 is	 that	 the	net	annual	mortgage	amounts	granted	varied	greatly	over	the	18	years	under	consideration;	from	a	high	increase	of	just	over	$1	trillion	in	2005	to	a	low	of	a	net	repayment	of	just	under	$500	billion	in	2010.		Table	 1	 reflects	 the	 combined	 activities	 of	 the	 whole	 U.S.	 financial	 sector	 with	 regard	 to	lending	for	the	purpose	of	acquiring	homes.	To	get	a	more	accurate	picture	of	the	mortgage	lending	 flows,	 one	 has	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 annual	 repayment	 element	 out	 of	 the	outstanding	mortgage	portfolio.	In	the	U.S.,	 it	 is	usual	to	take	out	a	30-year	mortgage.	If	one	assumes	 that	 the	 whole	 portfolio	 of	 mortgages	 is	 based	 on	 such	 30-year	 mortgages	 and	repayments	 take	 place	 on	 an	 equal	 percentage	 per	 mortgage	 per	 year,	 than	 the	 annual	increase/decrease	in	mortgage	volume	has	to	be	corrected	for	both	the	repayments	and	new	lending	that	have	taken	place	during	a	year.	The	combination	of	the	net	increase	in	mortgage	volume	 as	 per	 table	 1,	 plus	 the	 repayment	 of	 principal	 element	 forthcoming	 out	 of	 the	outstanding	mortgage	portfolio	constitute	the	annual	new	mortgage	lending	volume.	In	table	2	such	 lending	volume	has	been	calculated,	based	on	above	assumptions.	Of	course	real	 life	figures	may	deviate	somewhat	as	not	all	lenders	require	equal	repayment	terms,	neither	do	all	borrowers	wish	 to	 borrow	 for	 30	 years.	 As	 far	 as	 the	writer	 is	 aware,	 the	 aggregate	 of	 all	mortgage	repayments	during	a	year	are	not	reported,	only	the	year-end	balances.	
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																																																																																										Working	class	households	and	the	effects	of	the	financial	crisis©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		There	 is	 a	 second	 element.	 The	 existing	 outstanding	 mortgage	 portfolio	 is,	 per	 definition,	allocated	to	fund	the	existing	stock	of	homes.	New	mortgage	lending	levels	are	used	for	buying	new	homes;	move	 to	more	 expensive	 homes	 or	 use	 the	mortgage	 loan	 for	 some	 additional	consumption.	 In	 table	 2	 it	 has	 been	 assumed	 that	 all	 new	mortgage	 lending	 was	 used	 for	buying	new	homes.		Table	2	New	mortgage	 lending	over	 the	period	1997-2015	compared	to	 funds	allocated	per	new	home	started	and	to	average	home	price	for	homes	sold	in	the	U.S.			
	
Year	
									1	
Annual	new	
Mortgage	
Lending	volume	
X	U.S.	billion	
											2	
Allocated	per	each	
New	housing	
Start	
X	U.S.	dollars	
									3	
Average	U.S.	
Home	Sales	Price	
X	U.S.	dollars	
2	
						4	
Annual	
Housing	starts	
X	million	
3	
1997	 125	+	216=			341	 227,580	 176,200	 1.494	
1998	 135	+	302=			437	 276,230	 181,900	 1.582	
1999	 148	+	376=			524	 320,310	 195,600	 1.635	
2000	 161	+	383=			544	 348,620	 207,000	 1.559	
2001	 177	+	508=			685	 437.400	 213,200	 1.567	
2002	 201	+	706=			907	 555,360	 228,700	 1.633	
2003	 230	+	882=		1112	 635,300	 246,300	 1.751	
2004	 262	+	949=		1211	 662,480	 274,500	 1.828	
2005	 297	+1054=	1351	 653,290				 297,000	 2.068	
2006	 330	+	997	=	1327	 763,960	 305,900	 1.737	
2007	 354	+	703	=	1057	 794,740	 313,600	 1.330	
2008	 352	-			33			=				319	 345,612	 292,600	 		.923	
2009	 347	–	161		=			186	 344,450	 270,900	 		.540	
2010	 331	-		498		=		-167	 negative	 272,900	 		.536	
2011	 323	–	219		=			104	 167,580	 263,400	 		.623	
2012	 316		-	211		=			105	 142,430	 285,400	 		.740	
2013	 313	-				90		=				223	 301,890	 319,300	 		.898	
2014	 313	-						1		=					312	 304,480	 312.500	 1.026	
2015	 316	+			91	=					407	 350,900	 352,500	 1.161	
2016	 	 	 361,900	
(Jan-June)	
1.189	(June	
annualized)			The	$125	billion	mentioned	for	1997	in	column	1	of	table	2	reflects	the	repayments	volume	out	 of	 the	 total	 outstanding	 U.S.	 home	 mortgage	 portfolio,	 which	 based	 on	 the	 annual	mortgage	volume	levels	must	have	been	lent	out	again.	The	same	applies	for	the	$135	billion	in	1998,	 etc.	 Column	1	 reflects	 the	 total	production	volume	of	new	mortgages	 granted	per	year.	 	In	line	with	the	rapid	growth	of	the	total	outstanding	mortgage	portfolio	as	shown	in	table	 1,	 the	 replacement	 factor	 of	 mortgage	 repayments	 increases	 annually	 to	 2008	 and	shows	a	slight	decline	thereafter.			The	volume	of	new	mortgage	lending	for	new	homes	is	reflected	in	column	2	of	table	2.	This	column	reflects	the	amount	of	money	lend	per	new	home	started.	Each	annual	figure																																																										2	http://www.census.gov/const/uspriceann.pdf	3	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/HOUST	
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																																																																								Working	class	households	and	the	effects	of	the	financial	crisis©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		is	 the	result	of	 the	 total	mortgage	production	 levels	of	 the	combined	 financial	sector	 in	 the	U.S.	 in	a	particular	year.	 It	 is	 important	to	understand	what	this	column	represents.	 It	does	not	mean	that	the	actual	fund	flows	have	solely	gone	to	build	and	acquire	new	homes.	It	does	mean	that	if	all	new	mortgages	lending	in	a	particular	year	were	used	for	buying	new	homes,	the	price	of	such	homes	would	have	been	in	excess	of	the	prices	quoted	in	column	2	of	table	2.	 Such	prices	would	 also	be	 far	 in	 excess	 of	 the	 average	home	 sales	prices	 as	 reflected	 in	column	3	of	 table	2	over	the	period	1998-2007.	 	This	 lending	pattern	 implies	that	over	the	years	1998-2007	the	same	stock	of	homes	was	encumbered	to	a	higher	and	higher	degree.		Column	3	of	table	2	reflects	the	actual	supply	and	demand	levels	for	U.S.	homes	sold	in	that	it	shows	the	average	prices	achieved	in	the	housing	real	estate	markets.	Column	3	reflects	the	real	 average	 economic	market	 price;	 the	 price	 based	 on	 supply	 and	 demand	 for	 new	 and	existing	homes,	irrespective	of	how	such	homes	were	financed.			What	is	clear	out	of	table	2	is	that	the	annual	mortgage	production	volume	of	the	combined	U.S.	 financial	 sector	 bears	 no	 resemblance	 to	 what	 happened	 in	 the	 real	 sector	 housing	markets.			Financial	 markets	 and	 the	 real	 sector	 were	 on	 a	 divergent	 growth	 path.	 Why	 does	 this	matter?	 It	 did	 and	 does	 matter	 to	 the	 financial	 sector.	 Lending	 more	 than	 is	 required	 to	accommodate	the	volume	of	new	homes	being	built	means	that	 the	total	housing	stock	has	been	used	for	adding	a	higher	and	higher	 level	of	debt	 to	 it	 than	 is	necessary	to	satisfy	 the	demand	for	new	homes.	The	risk	profile	over	the	total	U.S.	mortgage	portfolio	deteriorates	as	a	result.	If	continued	for	a	number	of	years,	the	borrowers	who	need	to	repay	such	loans	will,	in	increasing	numbers,	no	longer	be	able	to	do	so.	The	volume	of	lending	pattern	sowed	the	seeds	 of	 self-destruction	 for	 the	 U.S.	 banking	 sector	 and	 also	 for	 investors	 who	 bought	mortgage	backed	securities.			Such	 a	 divergent	 growth	 path	 between	 the	 average	 home	 sales	 price	 and	 the	 mortgage	lending	based	prices	affects	those	who	need	to	borrow	most	to	buy	a	home:	the	working	class	households.	They,	even	more	than	others,	rely	on	prudent	risk	acceptance	criteria,	including	containing	the	macro-economic	risk	of	excessive	lending	patterns.			The	more	 than	 threefold	 increase	 in	 the	 annual	mortgage	production	 levels	between	1997	and	 2003	 should	 have	 set	 alarm	bells	 ringing.	 The	more	 than	 $635,000	 allocated	 per	 new	home	built	compares	poorly	–risk	wise-	with	the		$246,000	average	house	price.	No	volume	control	 measures	 were	 introduced	 in	 2003,	 nor	 in	 the	 later	 years	 to	 2007.	 The	 excessive	lending	pattern	continued	unabated.		In	a	previous	paper:	‘Helicopter	money	or	a	risk	sharing	approach?”4	it	was	shown	that	banks	accelerated	 the	 sale	 of	 sub-prime	mortgages	 from	2004	 and	 later	 years.	 They	 also	 offered	‘teaser	 rates’,	 which	 included	 below	 market	 start-up	 interest	 rates	 for	 some	 two	 years	followed	by	a	big	hike	in	rates	thereafter.	Simultaneously	the																																																																																																																																																											4	https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/71922.html	
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																																																																																																							Working	class	households	and	the	effects	of	the	financial	crisis©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		securitization	of	mortgage	portfolios	also	went	into	overdrive	from	2004	and	later	years,	as	did	the	growth	in	the	derivatives	volumes	linked	to	the	mortgage	markets.		The	home	mortgages	volume	growth	from	1997-2007	and	the	changes	in	the	funding	pattern	from	2004	onwards	were	the	key	elements	in	the	lead	up	to	the	most	severe	financial	crisis	for	nearly	a	century.		A	conclusion,	which	can	be	drawn	out	of	the	data	from	tables	1	and	2,	 is	that	from	1998	to	2007,	 the	 economic	 price	 of	 a	 home	 and	 the	 funds	 allocated	 for	 new	 homes	 went	 on	 a	divergent	growth	path	 to	 real	market	prices.	During	 the	years	1998-2007,	volumes	of	new	home	mortgages	were	loaded	onto	the	U.S.	housing	market,	which	exceeded,	by	far,	the	need	for	 funds	 for	 new	 homes	 and	 thereby	 undermined	 the	macro-economic	 risk	 profile	 of	 the	total	outstanding	U.S.	mortgage	portfolio.		Another	 conclusion	 is	 that	 the	 low	 ‘price	 of	 money’:	 the	 effective	 funds	 rate,	 encouraged	rather	 than	 dampened	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 U.S.	 mortgage	 portfolio	 during	 the	 period	 2002-2005.	From	2008-2015	the	opposite	effect	was	achieved	and	the	lowest	funds	rate	on	record	failed	to	stimulate	mortgage	lending.	More	than	$1	trillion,	equivalent	to	more	than	10%	of	the	 outstanding	mortgage	 portfolio,	 was	 repaid	 over	 this	 period.	 Such	 repayments	 impair	economic	growth	rates	and	discourage	new	home	building	levels	as	is	evidenced	by	the	data	in	table	2.		
1.3	The	consequences	of	overfunding	
	The	difference	between	a	home	as	an	asset	 category	 for	 individuals	and	as	equipment	and	know-how	as	used	in	the	production	sector	is	that	the	latter	case	buildings,	equipment	and	know-how	 are	 used	 to	 generate	 an	 income,	 while	 in	 the	 former	 case,	 homeowners	 are	dependent	on	earning	an	income	out	of	a	participation	in	the	production	sector.	This	applies	particularly	 to	 the	working	 class	 households.	 In	 the	 production	 sectors,	 companies	 always	have	the	ability	to	adjust	the	level	of	resources	used,	be	it	manpower	levels,	machineries,	raw	materials	 or	 other	 costs.	 Working	 class	 households	 work	 for	 a	 living	 and	 if	 their	 income	pattern	 is	 disturbed	 through	unemployment,	 below	 inflation	wage	 levels	 or	 they	 are	 faced	with	an	enforced	repayment	of	outstanding	debt	 levels,	 they	cannot	easily	 fall	back	on	cost	cutting.	 There	 are	 only	 a	 few	 expenses	 that	 can	 be	 cut.	Working	 class	 households	 need	 a	minimum	income	to	survive.		Who	paid	 the	 price	 for	 the	 lack	 of	 a	macro-economic	management	 structure	 for	 the	 home	mortgages	market?	The	banks	were	nearly	all	rescued	and	the	temporary	decrease	in	profit	levels	was,	 generally	 speaking,	not	born	by	management,	but	by	 shareholders.	 Investors	 in	mortgage	backed	securities	 lost	some	money,	which	 included	 individuals	around	the	world	and	so	did	some	pension	funds.	Insurance	companies	as	underwriters	of	derivatives	also	lost	money.		However,	the	real	direct	casualties	were	individual	households	who	had	a	mortgage	and	most	of	those	hit	hardest	belonged	to	the	working	class	household	sector.	The	banking	sector	 made	 the	 pendulum	 swing	 heavily	 against	 the	 debtors,	 who	 individually	 and	collectively	were	 forced	 to	 repay	 any	overdue	 interest,	 plus	prepay	 the	 remainder	 of	 their	outstanding	 mortgage.	 As	 explained	 more	 fully	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 45%	 of	 all	 mortgage	holders	were	confronted	with	a	foreclosure	filing	between	2005	and	2014.	The	more	indirect	casualties	were	the	workers	who	lost	their	jobs,	saw	their	income	growth	impaired	and	their		
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																																																																																																											Working	class	households	and	the	effects	of	the	financial	crisis©Drs	Kees	De	Koning			pension	 savings	 accumulate	 at	 a	 much	 slower	 pace,	 due	 to	 the	 low	 interest	 rate	 and	quantitative	easing	policies.		A	system	and	structure	that	 fails	 the	needs	not	of	 just	a	small	number	of	borrowers,	but	of	nearly	50%	of	them	over	a	short	period	of	time,	needs	to	be	reshaped	and	reformed.				
	
1.3.1	The	process	of	forcing	households	to	repay	outstanding	mortgages		The	 statistics	 for	 foreclosure	 filings,	 completed	 foreclosures	 and	 home	 repossessions	 all	point	to	the	deeply	negative	economic	effects	as	a	result	of	a	period	of	excess	lending	to	the	individual	 households.	 Between	 2005	 and	 2014	 over	 23.250	 million	 households	 were	confronted	with	foreclosure	filings5.	This	compares	to	the	about	51.6	million	households	who	had	a	mortgage	 in	 the	U.S.	 in	2007.	More	 than	45%	of	homeowners	with	a	mortgage	were	confronted	with	 a	 foreclosure	 filing	 over	 this	 period.	 It	 is	 very	 likely	 that	 the	 groups	most	affected	 were	 the	 younger	 workers,	 the	 under	 35	 generation,	 and	 the	 working	 class	households,	as	their	income	and	savings	levels	were	generally	the	lowest.	What	this	amazing	figure	also	shows	is	how	poor	the	macro-economic	risk	management	structure	had	been	in	the	run	up	to	2007.	It	is	very	unlikely	that	an	individual	household	was	confronted	twice	with	a	foreclosure	filing;	therefore	each	filing	meant	a	filing	against	a	different	household.		The	 foreclosure	 filings	 led	 to	18.3	million	of	 completed	 foreclosures	over	 the	period	2005-2014.	 The	 ultimate	 penalty	 for	 being	 unable	 to	 service	 an	 outstanding	mortgage	 debt	 is	 a	home	 repossession.	 Over	 the	 period	 2006-2014	 6,145,000	 homes	were	 repossessed.	 	 This	represents	almost	12%	of	the	total	number	households	who	had	a	mortgage	in	2007.		Lending	too	fast	leads	to	a	process	of	collecting	outstanding	loans	too	fast,	as	the	experience	over	the	period	1997-2015	has	shown.		
1.3.2	Home	ownership	levels	in	the	U.S.
 
  
 
The Census Bureau publishes quarterly data on the level of home ownership in the U.S. The data 
over the second quarter of 2016 show that the level of owner-occupier home ownership has 
dropped to 62.9% at the end of this quarter. This level is the lowest level of owner-occupier home 
ownership since 1965. Graph 1 shows the developments in home ownership levels over the last 50 
years.	
						 																																																																																																																																																			5	http://www.statisticbrain.com/home-foreclosure-statistics/	
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			Graph	 1	 clearly	 demonstrates	 that	 there	 have	 been	 two	 distinct	 long-term	 cycles	 in	 home	ownership	over	the	period	1965-2016.	The	first	cycle	started	in	1965	and	lasted	for	some	30	years	till	about	1994,	while	the	second	one	started	in	1995,	reached	its	peak	in	2004	at	69%,	stayed	 close	 to	 this	 top	 for	 another	 two	 years	 to	 2006	 and	 subsequently	 set	 in	 its	 strong	decline	continuing	to	the	second	quarter	of	2016,	when	it	reached	62.9%;	its	lowest	level	for	over	50	years.		The	aim	of	this	this	paper	is	not	to	try	to	work	out	whether	a	lower	or	higher	level	of	home	ownership	 is	 preferable	 for	 U.S.	 households,	 but	 rather	 whether	 the	 mortgage	 credit	expansion	and	subsequent	contraction	over	the	period	1998-2016	has	something	to	do	with	the	 substantial	 changes	 in	 the	 level	of	homeownership	 in	 the	U.S.	 and	what	 lessons	can	be	learned	as	a	result	of	the	patterns	observed	and	the	drivers	for	them.		Since	2008,	much	has	been	written	and	action	has	been	taken	about	how	the	banking	system	could	be	made	safer	and	action	has	been	taken.		Certainly	the	effects	of	an	increased	level	of	capitalization	for	a	number	of	banks	have	reduced	the	risks	for	most	banks.	U.S.	banks	now	have	$1.2	 trillion	of	core	capital,	more	 than	double	 the	 level	of	2007,	according	 to	a	recent	article	 in	 the	 Economist7.	 However	 a	 very	 large	 share	 of	 the	 risks	 over	 the	 U.S.	 mortgage	portfolio	have	been	 transferred	 from	 the	banking	 sector	 and	moved	 to	 the	mortgage	bond	markets.	The	latter	now	fund	and	own	$7	trillion	of	the	total	outstanding	mortgage	portfolios	of	$9.5	trillion.		Fannie	Mae,	Freddy	Mac	and	the	Federal	Housing	Agency	are	main	players	in	this	 area.	 They	 are	 state	 sponsored	 enterprises	 for	 the	 first	 two	 and	 a	 unit	 of	 the	 Federal	government	for	the	last	one.	In	essence	the	U.S.	government	is	guaranteeing	the	repayment	obligations	 of	 individual	 households.	 Again	 the	 lender	 community	 is	 being	 helped	 and	protected	 by	 the	 U.S.	 government	 against	 the	 risks	 of	 homeowners	 failing	 to	 service	 their	mortgage	debts.																																																																																																																										6	http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/home-ownership-rate	7	The	Economist,	London,	August	20th,	2016	
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																																																																				Working	class	households	and	the	effects	of	the	financial	crisis©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		What	about	the	borrowers?			The	 question	 of	 a	 “recapitalization”	 for	 working	 class	 households	 never	 reached	 the	headlines.	It	seems	fair	to	say	there	has	been	no	serious	discussion	about	this	subject.	Still	the	real	 sufferers	 from	 the	 lack	 of	 macro-economic	 intervention	 and	 management	 of	 the	mortgage	 lending	 process	 were	 the	 individual	 households,	 especially	 the	 working	 class	households	on	the	lower	end	of	pay	scales	and	savings	levels.		From	2007	onwards,	home	ownership	 levels	did	not	drop	because	the	American	public	did	not	want	to	own	a	home,	but	because	the	financial	sector	had	collectively	lent	so	much	money	to	 individual	 households	 over	 the	 period	 1997-2007	 that	 a	 huge	 gap	 had	 been	 created	between	the	average	market	price	 for	homes	and	the	 financial	sector	price	 for	new	homes.	The	collective	of	the	banking	and	the	financial	sectors	put	the	real	economic	sector	and	the	financial	one	on	a	collision	course,	with	the	real	sector	destined	to	be	the	loser.		As	will	 be	 explained	 later	 in	 this	 paper,	 a	more	 efficient	manner	 to	 solve	 a	 financial	 crisis	requires	 a	 shift	 in	 focus	 away	 from	 the	 lenders	 and	 concentrate	 onto	 solutions	 for	 the	borrowers.	This	has	been	lacking	to	date,	but	it	can	still	be	done.		Since	2006	enormous	pressure	was	placed	on	borrowers	to	service	their	mortgage	debt.	Over	45%	 of	 all	mortgagors	 (23.125	million)	were	 confronted	with	 foreclosure	 filings	 and	 18.3	million	 of	 them	 ended	 up	 suffering	 completed	 foreclosures.	 6.15	 million	 homes	 were	repossessed.	Just	this	latter	fact	alone	accounted	for	an	11.9%	drop	in	owner	occupied	homes	with	a	mortgage	or	an	8.1%	drop	of	all	owner	occupied	homes.	The	drop	in	home	ownership	from	69%	in	2004	to	62.9%	as	at	 the	end	of	 the	second	quarter	2016	represents	a	drop	of	9.1%.	The	total	picture	is	somewhat	more	complicated	as	new	owners	enter	the	market	and	the	stock	of	homes	expands,	but	 it	 is	without	doubt	 that	 the	repossession	of	over	6	million	homes	had	a	very	substantial	influence	on	the	number	of	households	owning	their	homes.		
1.3.3	The	“costs”	to	households	of	the	overfunding	process	
	Households	and	especially	working	class	households,	which	depend	on	income	growth	of	CPI	plus	a	small	margin,	are	the	most	vulnerable	to	average	house	prices	increasing	faster	than	the	CPI	index.	Over	the	period	1997-2006	average	house	prices	would	have	increased	from	$176,200	in	1997	to	$221,500	in	2006,	if	house	prices	had	followed	the	CPI	index.	However	the	actual	average	home	sales	price	was	$305,900	in	2006.	This	was	38%	higher	than	the	CPI	based	 house	 prices.	 While	 it	 is	 accepted	 that	 like	 for	 like	 needs	 to	 be	 compared	 and	 the	composition	of	the	average	house	may	have	moved	somewhat	over	the	nine-year	period,	it	is	highly	 likely	 that	 for	working	 class	 households	 the	 financial	 burden	 of	 buying	 a	 home	 did	increase	substantially.	Compounding	the	trend,	lenders	introduced	“teaser	rates”	and	100%	mortgages,	 especially	 from	 2004	 and	 later	 years.	 These	 new	 products	 enhanced	 the	vulnerability	of	all	households,	but	especially	those	belonging	to	the	working	classes.		The	risks	attached	to	such	vulnerability	materialized	in	the	shape	of	foreclosure	filings:	up	by	50%	in	2006	over	2005;	it	affected	1.2	million	households	in	2006;	in	2007	the	annual	filings																																																																																																	
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																																																																																																								Working	class	households	and	the	effects	of	the	financial	crisis©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		increased	to	2.2	million,	to	3.1	million	in	2008,	3.5	million	in	2009,	3.8	million	in	2010	and	3.9	million	in	2011.			The	 broader	 economic	 costs	 of	 such	 vulnerability	 reveal	 itself	 first	 and	 foremost	 in	 the	income	 allocation	 of	 the	 households	 involved.	 They	 were	 under	 great	 pressure,	 with	 the	threat	 of	 repossession	 of	 their	 home	 hanging	 over	 them,	 to	 keep	 up	 the	 servicing	 of	 their	debt.	Nearly	5	million	households	 succeeded	 in	 satisfying	 the	demands	 from	 their	 lenders,	but	more	 than	 18	million	 could	 not	meet	 the	 debt	 service	 commitments	 and	 foreclosures	were	completed.	6.145	million	homeowners	lost	their	home	altogether.	The	problem	with	the	recovery	 of	 outstanding	 mortgage	 debt	 is	 that	 it	 not	 only	 reduces	 the	 income	 levels	 that	households	have	for	“free	spending”,	but	simultaneously	such	actions	affect	house	prices	and	new	housing	starts.	Over	the	period	2007-2011	average	house	prices	dropped	from	$313,600	in	 2007	 to	 $263,400	 in	 2011	 and	 these	 prices	 are	 in	 nominal	 amounts,	 not	 taking	 into	account	 the	 inflation	 factor.	A	16%	drop	 in	 the	nominal	value	of	 the	average	home	 implies	that	part	of	the	savings	allocated	for	paying	back	an	outstanding	mortgage	loan	have	gone	to	waste.	For	those	unlucky	enough	to	have	their	homes	repossessed,	their	savings	level	in	their	home	would	have	been	 totally	wiped	out.	 It	 also	 implies	 that	mobility	of	 the	 labor	 force	 is	impaired	 as	 selling	 in	 downward	 market	 forces	 sellers	 to	 realize	 such	 losses.	 The	 new	housing	starts	 level	dropped	 from	 just	over	1.7	million	new	homes	 in	2006	 to	one-third	of	this	level:	540,000	in	2009	and	in	2010.		What	the	banking	system	collectively	did	and	for	all	intents	and	purposes	still	does	today	was	to	manage	mortgage	debt	 levels	by	comparing	 them	with	asset	values,	 rather	 than	manage	the	debt	to	income	levels.	Working	class	households	generally	do	not	use	their	home	to	make	a	profit,	but	use	it	in	order	to	have	a	roof	over	their	heads.	The	concept	that	the	recovery	of	an	outstanding	mortgage	loan	from	owner-occupiers	has	to	come	from	the	sale	of	an	asset	is	an	economically	incorrect	and	inefficient	concept.	It	extends	rather	than	shortens	the	lengths	of	a	recession	or	a	low	growth	period.	“Recapitalizing”	working	class	households	would	have	been	a	much	better	strategy	(see	Section	4	below).			
2.	Employment,	unemployment,	the	labor	force	participation	rate	and	income	growth	
over	the	period	2006-2015	
	Only	after	 it	became	clear	 to	employers	 that	serious	economic	 trouble	was	on	the	way,	did	they	reduce	recruiting	and	started	to	 lay	off	workers.	This	happened	from	May	2008	when	the	 unemployment	 rate	 increased	 from	 5.0%	 in	 April	 20088	to	 5.4%	 in	 May.	 By	 year-end	2008	the	rate	had	further	risen	to	7.3%	in	December.	By	December	2009	it	had	accelerated	to	9.9%,	 after	 it	 peaked	 in	 October	 2009	 at	 10%.	 In	 2010	 a	 slow	 recovery	 started	 and	 the	unemployment	rate	dropped	during	the	year	to	9.3%,	followed	its	drop	to	8.5%	by	December	2011,	to	7.9%	in	December	2012,	to	6.7%	in	December	2013,	to	5.6%	in	December	2014	and	5.0%	in	December	2015.																																																																																																															 																																																								8	http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000	
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																																																																																																								Working	class	households	and	the	effects	of	the	financial	crisis©Drs	Kees	De	Koning			What	is	remarkable	in	this	pattern	is	the	speed	of	the	unemployment	increase.	From	5%	in	April	2008	to	10%	in	October	2009	and	the	slow	return	back	down	to	5%	for	the	first	time	in	October	2015.	 It	 took	18	months	 to	move	 from	a	5%	unemployment	 rate	 in	April	 2008	 to	10%	by	October	2009	but	it	took	72	months	to	get	the	unemployment	rate	back	down	to	5%	by	October	2015.		Another	coincidence	worth	mentioning	is	the	changes	in	the	labor	force	participation	rate9.	The	 latter	 is	 defined	as	 the	percentage	of	 individuals	 of	 16	years	 and	over	out	 of	 the	 total	population	to	actively	be	in	a	job	or	be	looking	for	one.	By	May	2008	this	rate	was	66.1%	of	the	U.S.	population.	By	October	2009	 it	had	already	dropped	 to	65.0%	before	 sliding	 to	 its	lowest	level	of	62.4%	in	September	2015.	In	July	2016	the	level	was	slightly	higher	at	62.8%.		Usually	a	 lower	participation	rate	 is	 the	consequence	of	a	disillusionment	borne	by	a	 large	group	of	individuals	in	their	job	search	leading	to	a	cessation	of	job	seeking	altogether.	It	can	have	structural	reasons,	like	retiring	baby	boomers,	a	decline	in	workingwomen	and	a	higher	attendance	rate	at	colleges.	Whatever	the	causes	may	have	been,	the	slow	process	of	getting	back	 to	 the	 5%	 unemployment	 rate	 plus	 the	 persistent	 decrease	 in	 the	 labor	 force	participation	 rate	 implies	 that	 the	 recovery	 in	 the	 combined	 income	 levels	 of	 all	 income	earners	 took	 at	 least	 6	 years.	 This	 is	 before	 the	 drop	 in	 household	 real	median	 income	 is	taken	into	account.			Combined	incomes	were	not	only	under	pressure	from	the	foreclosure	filings,	but	also	from	the	loss	of	jobs	and	the	lowering	of	the	labor	force	participation	rate.	All	this	explains	why	an	aggressive	mortgage-lending	boom	is	particularly	destructive	to	working	class	households.		
2.1	Income	level	developments	
	The	U.S.	Census	Bureau	collects	data	about	the	household	income	developments.	The	Federal	Reserve	of	St.	Louis	publishes	charts	of	such	data.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																								
	
	
	
																																																									9	http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS11300000	
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Graph	2:	Real	Median	Household	Income	developments	over	the	period	1985-2014	
	
	
			In	1997	 the	 real	median	household	 income	was	$54,463	per	household.	On	a	CPI	 inflation	corrected	basis	it	became	$57,843	in	1999.	After	1999	it	dropped	back	to	$55,565	in	2004.	It	subsequently	 started	 improving	 to	 $57,357	 in	 2007.	 From	 2007	 onwards	 it	 dropped	 to	$53,657	in	2014	(latest	data	available)	via	a	low	of	$52,605	in	2012.		The	 highest	 levels	 of	 real	 household	 incomes	were	 reached	 in	 1999	 and	 2000,	with	 some	upward	movements	from	2004-2007	and	a	strongly	downward	movement	from	2007.	This	is	yet	 another	 sign	 of	 the	 impact	 that	 the	 financial	 crisis	 had	 on	 working	 class	 households.	Unemployment	levels	were	rising	steeply	from	2008-2009,	the	labor	force	participation	rate	was	on	a	downward	trend	and	median	incomes	could	not	even	hold	up	after	inflation	levels	were	taken	into	account.	All	signs	indicate	that	6	years	on,	the	recuperation	period	is	not	over	yet	for	individual	households.			
3.	Savings	for	retirement	
	In	the	Balance	Sheet	of	Households	and	Non-profit	Organizations	as	published	by	the	Federal	Reserve	a	category	is	included	which	reflects	pension	entitlements.	Such	entitlements	include	public	 and	 private	 defined	 benefit	 and	 defined	 contribution	 pension	 plans	 and	 annuities,	including	those	in	IRA’s	and	at	life	insurance	companies.	It	excludes	social	security.		At	year-end	1997	such	entitlements	were	worth	$8.0	trillion.	They	grew	to	$9.7	trillion	as	per	the	year-end	1999.	From	2000-2002	there	was	barely	any	growth	as	such																																																																																																					
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																																																																																															Working	class	households	and	the	effects	of	the	financial	crisis©Drs	Kees	De	Koning			entitlements	grew	 from	$10.0	 trillion	by	year-end	2000	 to	$10.2	 trillion	by	year-end	2002.	From	2003-2007	a	rapid	growth	rate	occurred	when	the	entitlements	increased	from	$11.3	trillion	 end	 2003	 to	 $15.1	 trillion	 end	 2007.	 The	 average	 growth	 rate	 was	 8.9%	 over	 the	period	1997-2007.	From	2007-2015	the	entitlements	increased	to	$20.9	trillion	by	end	2015.	The	average	growth	rate	over	this	period	was	4.8%	per	year.	The	future	growth	rate	is	to	be	expected	to	be	substantially	lower	than	4.8%	as	interest	rates	–including	for	U.S.	Treasuries-	are	at	or	near	their	lowest	level	ever.		There	 have	 been	 structural	 changes	 to	 the	 supply	 of	 pensions.	 Companies	 used	 to	 take	responsibility	 for	 the	 ‘pension	 promise’	 through	 the	 use	 of	 defined	 benefit	 (DB)	 schemes.	Companies,	 out	 of	 their	 profit	 margins,	 compensated	 workers	 for	 the	 fluctuations	 in	investment	 and	 inflation	 risks.	 In	 the	 U.S.	 in	 the	 early	 80’s	 60%	 of	 employees	 were	participating	in	a	defined	benefit	scheme.	In	2016	it	is	estimated	that	no	more	than	4%	are.	14%	of	 companies	 in	 the	U.S.	 still	 operate	DB	 next	 to	Defined	 Contribution	 (DC)	 schemes.	Companies	 that	 still	 have	 DB	 schemes	 are	 anxious	 to	 terminate	 such	 schemes.	 A	 good	explanation	 of	 the	 implications	 of	 Defined	 Benefit	 Pension	 Plans	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Dylan	 G.	Rassier’s	article10	written	for	the	U.S.	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis	in	August	2014.		In	 the	DC	schemes,	 the	 investment	and	 inflation	risks	are	 for	 the	account	of	 the	 individual.	What	has	changed	since	2007	is	the	interest	rate	environment.	On	6th	July	2007	10	year	U.S	Treasuries	 yielded	 5.19%	 per	 annum.	 On	 the	 same	 date	 in	 2016	 the	 yield	was	 1.38%	 per	annum.	The	gross	U.S.	government	debt	doubled	over	this	period	from	$11.36	trillion	in	2007	(Federal,	State	and	Local)	to	$22.52	trillion	in	2016	while	the	yield	on	10	year	U.S.	Treasuries	dropped	dramatically.	Year-to-date	inflation	rate	is	running	at	0.84%,	therefore	there	is	still	a	small	positive	margin	between	the	yield	on	10	year	Treasuries	and	inflation	level.	However	if	the	individual	needs	to	invest	for	the	short	period	from	1	month	to	three	years	Treasuries,	on	6th	July	2016	all	these	Treasury	holdings	were	yielding	less	than	the	inflation	level.		To	quote	Allister	Heath,	Deputy	Editor	of	the	U.K’s	Daily	Telegraph11,	in	a	recent	article:	“Cheap	money	is	destroying	all	our	futures	and	killing	capitalism”	He	adds	that	it	has	become	impossible	to	live	off	interest	or	dividends.	As	an	example	he	states	that	a	decade	ago	anybody	seeking	to	enjoy	a	£35,000	annuity	 in	retirement	needed	to	accumulate	£761,000	to	do	so.	Today,	 the	savings	pot	required	would	be	worth	£1.4million,	beyond	the	reach	of	almost	everybody.	He	concludes	that	“free	credit”	sought	by	governments	comes	at	a	crippling	hidden	cost.		Again,	 who	 are	 the	 biggest	 casualties	 from	 the	 financial	 crisis	 among	 U.S.	 households:	 the	working	 class	 households!	 They	 lost	 out	 on	 employment	 opportunities	 for	 at	 least	 6	 years	since	 2008;	 they	 saw	 their	 incomes	 grow	 at	 a	 level	 below	 inflation	 levels	 over	 the	 same	period;	over	6	million	households	lost	their	homes	and	their	savings	in	it;	and	due																																																																																														 																																																								10	https://www.bea.gov/papers/pdf/Private%20DB%20Pension%20Plan%20Benchmark%20Methodology%20August%202014.pdf	11	Allister	Heath,	Deputy	Editor,The	Daily	Telegraph,	“Cheap	money	is	destroying	all	our	futures	and	killing	capitalism”	,	London	25	August	2016	
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4.	Recapitalization	of	individual	households	
	Loans,	 including	mortgage	 loans,	are	a	 temporary	extension	of	 income	 levels.	For	company	loans,	 the	 banking	 sector	 has	 always	 looked	hard	 at	 future	 cash	 flows	 out	 of	 the	 activities	undertaken.	 Shareholders	were	 and	 are	 asked	 to	 take	 the	 primary	 risk	 if	 activities	 do	 not	generate	the	cash	flows	according	to	plans.	Shareholders	constitute	the	buffer	in	risk	taking.	Hence	it	was	logical	that	after	the	financial	crisis,	U.S.	banks	had	to	increase	their	buffers	by	attracting	 new	 shareholder	 funding.	 Some	 banks,	 including	 investment	 banks,	 were	 also	penalized	for	misleading	their	client	base	about	the	risks	that	were	transferred	to	mortgage	bondholders.		The	real	difference	between	a	household	taking	up	a	mortgage	loan	or	a	company	getting	a	loan	is	that	in	a	household	the	role	of	shareholder	is	intertwined	with	the	role	as	borrower.	There	is	no	outside	shareholder	in	the	owner-occupier	situation.	The	debt	servicing	risks	are	totally	 dependent	 on	 the	 income	 earning	 capacity	 of	 the	 household.	 	 As	 has	 been	demonstrated	 in	previous	 chapters,	 lending	more	 to	 the	housing	markets	over	a	 few	years	than	 is	 needed	 to	 build	 the	 required	 new	 homes	 at	 market	 rates,	 leads	 to	 individual	households	 being	 burdened	 with	 long-term	 debts	 they,	 in	 large	 numbers,	 can	 no	 longer	afford.	 	 Unemployment	 levels	 increase,	 the	 recovery	 of	 overdue	 payments	 start,	 home	repossessions	 go	 up,	 house	 prices	 drop	 and	 new	 housing	 start	 levels	 drop.	 Income	 levels	grow	 less	 than	 inflation	 levels.	 Interest	 rates	 drop	 but	 the	 down	 hill	 speed	 of	 increased	unemployment	 was	 four	 times	 faster	 than	 the	 recovery	 speed.	 Pension	 provision	arrangements	are	made	much	harder.		The	short	and	long-term	costs	to	the	working	class	households	do	not	only	affect	them,	but	such	costs	directly	influence	economic	growth	levels,	government	tax	receipts	and	company	profitability	levels.			Saving	 the	 banks	might	 have	 been	 necessary	 in	 order	 for	 the	U.S.	 economy	 to	 continue	 to	function,	but	such	action	should	not	be	confused	with	saving	economic	growth	levels.	Only	an	economic	management	 system	 that	 corrects	 the	 error	 of	 “excessive	 lending”	 to	 individual	households,	 can	 save	 economic	 growth	 levels	 and	 enable	 them	 to	 continue	without	major	disruption.		The	current	approach	of	ensuring	that	nearly	all	banks	were	saved	and	that	current	mortgage	bondholders	 can	 count	 on	 government	 support	 do	 little,	 if	 anything,	 for	 individual	households.	 However	 helping	 households	 to	 overcome	 short	 term	 cash	 flow	 problems	 in	keeping	 up	 with	 mortgage	 payments,	 not	 only	 avoids	 a	 serious	 economic	 downturn,	 but	keeps	people	in	their	jobs,	avoids	a	dangerous	downturn	in	house	prices,	removes	the	need	for	extremely	low	interest	rates	and	a	program	of	quantitative	easing,	improves	the	tax	take	of	the	U.S.	government	and	lowers	its	deficit	funding.				
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																																																																																																																																																																																																							Working	class	households	and	the	effects	of	the	financial	crisis©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		The	 result	 is	 that	 taking	 such	 action	 negates	 the	macro-economic	 domino	 effect	 described	above	 at	 source,	 thereby	 extending	 the	 period	 of	 prosperity	 for	 not	 only	 working	 class	households	but	for	all	households.		In	order	to	solve	the	problem	of	increased	levels	of	insolvency	among	individual	households	in	 relation	 to	 mortgage	 debt	 in	 times	 of	 economic	 distress,	 a	 risk	 partner	 needs	 to	 be	introduced.	Households	would	 benefit	 greatly	 from	 a	 temporary	 boost	 in	 their	 liquidity	 to	overcome	the	shortfall	in	cash.	They	need	a	form	of	recapitalization.		It	is	obvious	that	such	recapitalization	will	not	come	from	the	lenders,	whose	only	objective	is	to	 recoup	as	much	of	 their	outstanding	 loans	as	possible	and	 in	 the	quickest	possible	 time	period.	 For	 financial	 institutions	 profit	 levels	 drive	 their	 actions,	 not	 the	 macro-economic	impact	of	such	actions.		The	only	solution	is	a	state	sponsored	one.	To	date,	 the	state	sponsored	choice	has	been	to	guarantee	(implicitly	or	explicitly)	the	outstanding	mortgage	bonds	to	the	extent	of	some	$7	trillion,	which	on	a	mortgage	portfolio	of	$9.5	trillion	is	a	very	sizeable	commitment.	Of	the	$7	trillion	$1.763	trillion	is	on	the	balance	sheet	of	the	Federal	Reserve	per	August	25,	2016.	The	lenders	have	been	implicitly	guaranteed	that	they	will	receive	their	money	back	in	due	course.		There	 is	another,	a	cheaper	and	more	effective	solution.	To	make	an	arrangement	with	 the	borrowers,	 one	 needs	 a	 state	 owned	 institution	 to	 do	 so:	 A	 U.S.	 National	 Mortgage	 Bank	(NMB).	The	NMB	can	be	the	risk	partner	of	individual	households	when	needed.	It	needs	to	be	set	up	now	in	order	to	be	ready	for	the	next	recession.		
How	setting	up	a	National	Mortgage	Bank	may	serve	as	a	macro-economic	tool.	
	
4.1	The	creation	of	a	lender	of	last	resort	for	individual	households	
	A	 National	 Mortgage	 Bank	 (NMB)	 would	 not	 be	 a	 mortgage	 lender	 or	 originator	 in	 the	normal	sense.	One	could	not	visit	its	office	to	obtain	a	mortgage.	It	is	also	not	a	Fannie	Mae	or	Freddy	Mac,	organizations	 that	 facilitate	 long-term	 fixed	rate	mortgages.	What	 it	would	be,	is	an	instrument	of	economic	policy,	only	to	be	called	into	action	as	and	when	the	number	of	 foreclosure	 proceedings	 start	 to	 grow	 substantially.	 An	 NMB	 would	 be	 the	 temporary	“joint	shareholder”	for	those	in	need	when	lending	volumes	have	run	out	of	hand.	An	NMB	would	temporarily	improve	the	cash	flow	position	of	working	class	households	and	reduce	the	pressure	on	selling	homes.		In	preparation	for	countering	the	next	recession,	the	U.S.	could	take	the	step	to	legislate	for	and	subsequently	set	up	a	National	Mortgage	Bank.			
	
4.2	How	an	NMB	could	operate	
	The	mortgage	crisis	originated	in	the	U.S.,	therefore	it	is	probably	appropriate	to	formulate	for	this	country	of	how	an	NMB	could	work:	
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• Legal	framework:	A	law	could	be	enacted,	which	sets	out	the	operating	structure	for	 an	 NMB,	 its	 legal	 rights	 and	 obligations,	 its	 funding	 structure	 and	 its	 first	management	set	up;		
• Ownership:	Due	to	its	character	as	a	tool	of	economic	policy,	the	NMB	needs	to	be	a	100%	owned	U.S.	government	entity;		
• Start	 and	 closure	 of	 the	 operating	 period:	 A	 designated	 team	 from	 the	 U.S.	government	 charged	with	 economic	policy	decisions	 could	 instruct	 the	NMB	 to	start	 operating.	 The	 basis	 for	 such	 decision	 is	 a	 rapid	 increase	 in	 the	 level	 of	foreclosure	 proceedings.	 The	 same	 team	 would	 decide	 when	 to	 close	 the	operating	period	when	the	level	of	foreclosures	drops	off	rapidly;		
• Tools:	 The	 tools	 handed	 to	 the	 NMB	 will	 be	 to	 provide	 cash	 to	 individual	households	 confronted	 with	 foreclosure	 proceedings.	 The	 quantum	 of	 cash	received	 could	 vary	 from	 income	 class	 to	 income	 class,	 with	 for	 instance	 the	lowest	income	class	to	receive	up	to	60%	of	monthly	payments,	the	second	group	50%,	 etc.	 These	 payments	 vary	 per	 mortgagor,	 but	 include	 an	 interest	 and	 a	principal	 element.	 The	 duration	 of	 such	 payments	 could	 be	 decided	 by	 above	designated	team	on	basis	of	the	status	of	the	recovery.	Company	owned	or	other	buy-to-let	mortgagors	may	not	qualify.	During	the	economic	recovery	period			the	funds	 provided	 could	 be	 granted	 at	 0%	 interest	 rate.	 During	 the	 designated	‘economic	 recovery	 period’	 and	 thereafter	 a	 sub-ordinated	mortgage	would	 be	granted	to	the	NMB	as	security	over	the	accumulated	principal	amount	lent.	Such	sub-ordination	would	 be	 to	 the	 existing	 level	 of	 an	 outstanding	mortgage	 only.	After	 the	 closure	 of	 the	 economic	 recovery	 period	 all	 amounts	 granted	 to	households	would	increase	their	mortgage	debt	to	the	NMB.	The	NMB	could	fund	itself	with	funds	from	the	Federal	Reserve,	based	on	a	U.S.	government	guarantee.	In	 the	period	 after	 recovery,	 the	 payments	 could	 be	 gradually	 lowered	 to	 zero,	and	the	interest	rate	of	the	loan	set	at	the	ten-year	government	bond	rate	plus	a	small	margin.	After	 the	official	 end	of	 the	 recovery	period	mortgagors	 could	be	asked	to	gradually	fully	service	their	interest	payments.	The	ultimate	repayment	of	the	outstanding	principal	amount	could	take	place	as	and	when	the	borrower	wishes	and	is	alive.	Upon	death	the	full	amount	outstanding	becomes	payable;																																																											
• Referral	 process:	 As	 soon	 as	 banks	 or	 financial	 institutions	 declare	 that	 a	individual	mortgagor	 has	 been	 informed	 about	 foreclosure,	 the	 case	 should	 be	transferred	to	the	NMB;		
• Beneficiaries:	Significant	beneficiaries	of	the	risk	sharing	approach	would	be	the	lending	 banks	 and	 mortgage	 bondholders.	 The	 NMB	 should	 be	 placed	 in	 a	position	to	charge	the	fund	providers	for	the	reduced	risks	over	their	mortgage	related	portfolios.																																																																																				
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4.3	Economic	benefits	of	having	an	NMB	
	There	will	 be	 a	 number	 of	 core	 benefits	 from	 having	 an	 NMB	 in	 operation.	 A	 first	 one	 is	related	 to	 the	 spending	 power	 of	 individual	 households.	 The	 cash	 injection	 will	 help	mortgagors	to	 fulfill	 their	mortgage	obligations,	and	equally	 it	enables	them	to	continue	to	spend	on	other	goods	and	services.	Had	the	NMB	been	in	place	in	2007,	such	increased	levels	of	economic	activity	would	have	increased	government	tax	revenues.	As	a	consequence,	the	NMB’s	operation	would	have	markedly	slowed	down	the	U.S.	government	debt	increase.	The	level	of	Federal	government	debt	however	increased	from	$9	trillion	in	2007	to	$19	trillion		(May	2016).		A	second	benefit	is	related	to	house	prices.	When	the	majority	of	foreclosure	proceedings	no	longer	lead	to	home	repossessions,	house	prices	will	drop	less	forcefully	and	be	more	stable.	Such	 stability	 will	 encourage	 potential	 homeowners	 to	 come	 to	 the	 housing	market.	 This	may	also	lead	to	a	more	stable	level	of	new	housing	starts.		Introducing	 the	 NMB	 system	 makes	 individual	 households	 less	 reliant	 on	 extremely	 low	interest	rates.	The	aim	of	the	NMB	is	not	to	attract	more	households	to	the	housing	market.	Commercial	 banks	 do	 that.	 The	 NMB’s	 aim	 is	 to	 help	 existing	 homeowners	 to	 fulfil	 their	mortgage	 obligations.	 For	 these	 homeowners,	 it	will	 turn	 a	 long-term	 borrowing	 position	into	a	temporary	favorable	cash	flow	position,	independent	of	the	current	prevailing	interest	rate.	When	 consumer	 demand	 levels	 fluctuate	 less,	 there	 is	 less	 need	 for	 an	 interest	 rate	stimulus.																																																																																																					With	the	existence	of	an	NMB,	the	Fed’s	interest	rate	setting	policy	can	move	more	freely.		Quantitative	easing	injections	are	an	indirect	method	of	encouraging	borrowings.	Setting	up	an	NMB	helps	 households	 in	 need	 to	 fulfill	 their	 existing	mortgage	 obligations	 in	 a	 direct	manner,	 rather	 than	 involve	 them	 in	 more	 private	 sector	 borrowings.	 It	 re-aligns	outstanding	 debt	 with	 future	 earnings	 levels.	 An	 NMB	 creates	 a	 direct	 link	 between	maintaining	 consumption	 levels	 and	 existing	 household	 debt	 levels.	 The	 economy	 will	become	less	dependent	on	QE	injections.		In	 a	previous	paper:	 “Why	borrowers	 rather	 than	banks	 should	have	been	 rescued”12,	 the	author	did	calculate	that	the	total	NMB	lending	level	during	the	operating	period	2006-2013	would	 have	 been	 about	 $1.2	 trillion.	 This	 amount	 consists	 partly	 of	 the	 zero	 interest	 rate	subsidy	 during	 the	 period	 classified	 as	 the	 recovery	 period;	 for	 the	 remainder	 it	 covers	principal	amount	payments	as	advanced	by	the	NMB	to	the	borrower.	The	combined	amount	is	 still	 $500	billion	 less	 than	 the	Fed	–as	 a	 result	 of	 its	 quantitative	 easing	operations-has	currently	in	mortgage-backed	securities	on	its	books.			The	 team	 in	 charge	 of	 setting	 the	 starting	 and	 end	 date	 of	 the	 intervention	 period	 could	make	proposals	to	Congress	about	the	desirable	levels	of	subsidy	and	loan	amounts	for																																																											12	https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68990/	
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																																																																																																																								Working	class	households	and	the	effects	of	the	financial	crisis©Drs	Kees	De	Koning			each	 income	 group.	 The	 key	 cash	 transfer	 element	 would	 have	 been	 a	 very	 welcome	rearrangement	 of	 an	 individual	 household’s	 cash	 flows.	 Improvements	 in	 short-term	liquidity	will	help	long-term	solvency	for	households.	
	
	
5.	Preventive	measures	
	The	fact	that	no	preventive	measures	were	taken	in	2003-2007	to	stem	the	annual	volume	of	the	home	mortgage	production	 levels,	does	not	mean	that	such	measures	cannot	be	put	 in	place	 today.	 The	 first	 issue	 is	 that	 the	 overall	 management	 of	 such	 a	 system	 should	 be	entrusted	to	one	U.S.	wide	regulator,	rather	than	have	different	central	and	state	authorities	each	deciding	for	themselves	what	is	the	optimal	mortgage	production	level	for	their	area.			
5.1	An	early	warning	system		An	 ‘early	warning’	system	could	be	 installed	which	sounds	an	alarm	once	 it	becomes	clear	that	 the	mortgage	 allocation	 for	 new	 homes	 by	 far	 exceeds	 the	 real	market	 house	 prices.	Such	a	system	could	use	‘traffic	lights’	to	warn	banks	that	caution	is	required.		Green	would	indicate	that	the	mortgage	markets	are	not	growing	too	fast	and	may	continue	to	 grow	 until	 further	 notice.	 Amber	 for	 when	 the	 speed	 of	 mortgage	 lending	 growth	 is	becoming	 excessive	 and	 signaling	 those	 lenders	 should	 slow	 down	 their	 lending	 volumes	with	red	reserved	for	when	mortgage	volumes	are	growing	too	fast.	The	Fed	could	indicate	the	 rate	 at	 which	 the	 mortgage	 market	 may	 safely	 grow.	 Any	 institution	 exceeding	 such	speed	of	growth	might	be	penalized	as	 it	 risks	undermining	 the	volume	 targets	needed	 to	avoid	a	boom-bust	situation.		Banks	 cannot	be	 expected	 to	 stop	mortgage	 lending	 volumes	 to	 grow	voluntarily,	 hence	 a	simple	but	effective	traffic	management	system	helps	to	avoid	that	the	U.S.	economy	will	not	return	to	the	2007-2008	financial	crisis	situation	again.		
5.2	Set	up	a	home	mortgage	quality	control	system	
	Banks	and	other	financial	institutions	are	very	adept	in	developing	products	that	help	their	profits	 rise	 in	 the	 short	 term.	 Subprime	mortgages	 and	 ‘teaser’	 rates	 are	 just	 a	 few	of	 the	examples	 that	 come	 to	mind.	Mortgage	backed	 securitization	 is	 another	 example.	There	 is	nothing	wrong	with	 the	 principle	 of	 finding	 investors	 other	 than	 banks	 to	 fund	mortgage	portfolios.	 However	 the	 practice	 as	 executed	 in	 the	 U.S.	 from	 2004-2007	 left	 much	 to	 be	desired.		Banks	may	prefer	their	freedom	of	the	markets,	but	market	freedoms	should	not	come	with	a	price	 tag	 for	society	as	a	whole,	which	 is	at	odds	with	 the	benefit	of	 the	entrepreneurial	freedoms	acquired.	For	instance	it	cannot	be	right	that	over	the	period	2006-2013	as	a	result	of	bad	bank	practices	21.3	million	U.S.	households	were																																																																																													
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																																																																																															Working	class	households	and	the	effects	of	the	financial	crisis©Drs	Kees	De	Koning			confronted	with	foreclosure	proceedings	or	nearly	45%	of	all	mortgagors.	It	can	also	not	be	right	that	1	out	of	every	8	households	with	a	mortgage	lost	their	home	over	the	same	period.	It	 cannot	 be	 right	 that	 7.8	million	workers	 lost	 their	 jobs	 between	 2008	 and	 201013	as	 a	consequence	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 Finally	 it	 cannot	 be	 right	 that	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	financial	 crisis	U.S.	 government	 debt	more	 than	doubled	 from	$9.22	 trillion	 by	 the	 end	 of	2007	to	$18.922	trillion	by	the	end	of	201514.		For	these	reasons	a	mortgage	quality	control	system	could	be	put	in	place.	In	1994	Congress	with	the	support	of	the	Fed	passed	the	Home	Ownership	and	Equity	Protection	Act	(HOEPA),	to	outlaw	abusive	mortgage	lending	practices.	However	this	Act	concentrated	on	predatory	lending	 practices	 and	 it	 did	 not	 intend	 to	 impede	 ‘legitimate’	 access	 to	 the	 subprime	mortgage	markets.	When	the	Act	was	drafted	no	one	had	foreseen	the	volume-lending	boom	of	the	early	2000s.	Furthermore	implementation	of	the	Act	was	not	helped	by	the	fact	that	implementation	was	 executed	by	many	 regulatory	bodies,	without	 anyone	of	 them	having	full	management	control.			A	major	flaw	of	the	Act	is	that	it	dealt	only	with	individual	household	cases	and	not	with	the	macro	economic	 impact	of	a	mortgage	 lending	boom	supported	by	banking	practices	often	no	longer	based	on	the	ability	of	households	to	repay	outstanding	mortgages	out	of	current	income,	but	out	of	future	expected	values	of	the	home	being	financed.	The	‘crime’,	which	the	Act	 failed	 to	 cover,	 is	 an	 ‘economic	 crime’,	 committed	by	wantonly	placing	 customers	 in	 a	‘loss’	 situation	when	 it	was	known	or	could	be	expected	 that	house	prices	were	no	 longer	rising.	
	
	
5.3	Marry	the	early	warning	system	with	the	quality	control	one	
	Mortgage	lending	was	at	the	amber	level	in	2002-2003.	The	policy	measures	needed	at	that	point	 would	 have	 been	 twofold:	 to	 introduce	 a	 product	 liability	 system	 for	 banks	 and	introduce	a	macro-economic	reserve	policy	(MERP).		Most	companies,	when	they	sell	a	product,	provide	a	guarantee	that	the	product	will	operate	satisfactorily	 during	 the	 lifetime	 of	 the	 product.	 Banks	 cannot	 guarantee	 that	 the	 home	mortgage	client	will	not	default	on	home	mortgage	payments.	However	the	amber	stage	in	home	mortgage	 lending	 indicates	 that	 the	net	volume	growth	 in	new	lending	 is	reaching	a	dangerous	 pitch.	 The	 Fed	 and	with	 it	 all	 other	 bank	 and	 financial	 sector	 regulators	 could	stipulate	 that	 any	 new	 home	 mortgage	 requires	 a	 financial	 reserve	 set	 aside	 within	 the	originating	 institution	at	a	higher	 level	 than	 the	previous	one.	For	 instance,	 if	3%	was	 the	expectation	of	the	annual	level	of	doubtful	debtors	before	the	amber	stage,	the																																																																																																																																																																																																																														13	http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/203740.pdf	14	http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/debt/search?startMonth=12&startDay=31&startYear=2007&endMonth=12&endDay=31&endYear=2015	
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																																																																																										Working	class	households	and	the	effects	of	the	financial	crisis©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		Fed	could	dictate	that	5%	is	added	to	the	reserves	for	any	new	home	mortgage.	The	second	stipulation	could	be	that	such	reserves	have	to	be	kept	in	place	until	the	home	mortgage	has	been	 fully	repaid.	Selling	 the	 funding	side	of	 the	mortgage	 to	 third	parties	should	not	be	a	factor	 in	 releasing	 such	 reserves.	 They	 should	 stay	 in	 place	 until	 the	 end	 of	 the	mortgage	period.		The	 ‘red’	 stage	 requires	 a	 more	 drastic	 approach,	 as	 this	 stage	 reflects	 the	 fact	 that	 the	macro-economic	 development	 of	 the	 relevant	 country	 is	 at	 serious	 risk.	 This	 happened	during	2004-2006	in	the	U.S.		A	material	macro-economic	risk	necessitates	a	quite	different	counter-measure.			Jobs	are	at	 risks.	7.8	million	people	 lost	 their	 jobs	as	a	 consequence	of	 the	 financial	 crisis.	Government	funding	is	at	risk	as	demonstrated	by	the	doubling	of	government	debt	from	$9	trillion	to	nearly	$19	trillion	over	the	period	2007-2015.	The	financial	stability	of	25	million	households	 was	 at	 risk	 as	 foreclosure	 proceedings	 were	 started	 against	 them.	 Building	enough	 new	 homes	was	 put	 at	 risk.	 If	 annually	 1.8	million	 new	 homes	were	 needed,	 the	cumulative	shortfall	over	the	period	2008-2015	reached	7.830	million.		The	macro-economic	 risks	 caused	by	 an	 excessive	 speed	 of	 lending	put	 not	 only	 banks	 at	risk,	but	also	jobs,	incomes,	pension	savings,	government	expenditure,	home	building	and	of	course	companies	due	to	a	reduced	demand	for	goods	and	services.		A	well	considered	response	would	be	to	ensure	that	at	the	red	stage	the	new	reserves	built	up	 for	 doubtful	 debtors	 on	 home	mortgages	 are	 available	 not	 just	 to	 the	 banks	 and	 their	shareholders,	but	to	the	population	at	 large:	 from	Wall	Street	to	Main	Street.	Such	a	MERP	would	consist	of	two	elements:	firstly,	it	would	increase	the	reserve	ratio	to	some	8%	for	all	new	 home	mortgage	 lending	 and	 secondly,	 the	 reserves	 should	 be	 placed	 away	 from	 the	lender	and	at	the	Fed	in	the	form	of	U.S.	government	securities.	It	could	be	decided	that	such	reserves	have	to	stay	at	the	Fed	until	the	mortgage	loans	have	been	repaid.	Furthermore	as	the	threat	 is	one	to	the	macro-economy	of	the	U.S.,	such	reserves	should	be	pledged	to	the	Fed	and	the	U.S.	government	in	case	of	bank	failure.	In	effect	the	transfer	of	reserves	to	the	Fed	would	constitute	a	provisional	penalty	for	the	financial	institution	involved	in	order	to	get	the	micro	and	the	macro	policies	in	line.	Rather	than	issuing	penalties	after	the	recession	period	 as	 is	 being	 done	 currently,	 a	 preventive	method	would	 be	 the	 up-front	 transfer	 of	reserve	 amounts	 based	 on	 net	 new	 home	mortgage	 lending.	 	 The	 return	 of	 such	 reserve	funds	to	the	financial	institution	involved	should	only	take	place	once	the	performance	of	the	underlying	mortgages	can	be	assessed	as	satisfactory	with	‘satisfactory’	denoting	a	portfolio	performance	in	line	with	that	of	the	best	lending	years.		
	
5.4	 Introduce	 index-linked	 Treasuries	 especially	 for	 pension	 savers	 and	 pension	
funds	
	The	U.S.	government	will	need	to	decide	whether	it	is	has	struck	the	right	balance	between	getting	its	government	debt	level	funded	at	the	lowest	possible	costs	and	thereby	benefitting	tax	payers	in	the	short	run,	or	should	it	acknowledge	that	borrowing																																																																																														
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																																																																																																						Working	class	households	and	the	effects	of	the	financial	crisis©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		at	costs	close	to	or	below	inflation	level	constitutes	a	penalty	for	savers	who	wish	to	build	up	a	pension	pot	for	future	expenditure.		The	 U.S.	 and	 other	 governments	 already	 employ	 many	 different	 rates	 to	 reward	 savers	depending	on	the	length	of	commitment	of	such	savers	to	fund	government	debt	levels.	No	government	wants	to	fund	its	debt	on	a	daily	rollover	basis,	notwithstanding	that	it	is	easily	the	cheapest	alternative	in	the	short	term.		Among	all	these	different	rates,	it	must	be	possible	to	create	a	special	category	for	savers	and	savings	 institutions	 (pension	 funds)	 on	 their	 behalf	 to	 have	 the	benefit	 of	 an	 index	 linked	Treasury	product,	which	caters	 for	 long-term	savers	who	wish	 to	build	up	and	maintain	a	financial	reserve	for	future	use.	Such	index	linked	Treasuries	could	be	devised	especially	for	one	category	of	savers:	those	households	or	institutions	on	their	behalf	who	want	to	build	up	such	 funds	 for	 use	 in	 retirement.	 This	means	 that	 trading	 restrictions	 could	be	 applied	 to	prevent	using	such	Treasuries	for	other	purposes	than	intended.	The	benefit	to	households	would	 be	 substantial	 as	 the	 risk	 of	 inflation	 level	 developments	 is	 taken	 away	 from	 their	investment	worries.		
	
6.	Some	conclusions	
	As	 this	 paper	has	demonstrated,	 economic	 growth	 levels	 based	on	 the	quicksand-like	 and	toxic	 foundations	 of	 a	 mortgage-borrowing	 binge	 can	 lead	 to	 disastrous	 consequences,	especially	for	working	class	households.	The	whole	mortgage	super-cycle	took	nine	years	to	develop	 and	 eventually,	 implode	 (from	 1998-2007).	 	 It	 has	 taken	 a	 further	 nine	 years	 to	return	to	something	approximating	normality.	 In	2015,	 the	average	house	price	 in	 the	U.S.	and	 the	mortgage	 funded	 price	 for	 new	 homes	were	 almost	 equal	 for	 the	 first	 time	 since	1997.	The	unemployment	cycle	took	just	18	months	to	move	up	from	5%	in	2008	to	10%	in	2009	but	72	months	to	reach	the	5%	level	again.		All	these	long	and	short-term	movements	require	correction	from	time	to	time.	Prevention	would	have	been	 the	best	 strategy.	Correction	 in	 the	 form	of	 establishing	and	operating	 a	National	Mortgage	Bank	would	have	prevented	the	errors	of	the	past	becoming	a	burden	for	the	 future.	 The	main	 beneficiaries	would	 have	 been	 those	 households	 that	 have	 the	 least	buffer	in	economic	downturns	and	the	most	to	lose:	the	working	class	households!				Drs	Kees	De	Koning	Chorleywood,	U.K	2nd	September	2016																																																																			
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